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Inferiority and bereavement: Implicit psychological commitments in the 
cultural history of Scottish psychotherapy 
 
The author has argued that psychoanalytic psychotherapy was seen in Scotland as a 
way to purify Christianity of supernaturalism and moralism, and to propel the faith in a 
scientifically rational and socially progressive direction. In making this historiographic 
claim, certain disciplinary protocols are followed, such as the symmetry postulate and a 
deprecation of reductive psychohistorical explanation. Nonetheless, the contemporary 
historian of psychotherapy is a psychologized subject whose historical practice rests 
upon a complex, prereflective background of psychological presuppositions. 
Keywords: Scottish psychotherapy; inferiorism; discursive bereavement; Christianity; 
historiography. 
Introduction 
For over a decade, I have been working in various ways on the history of psychiatry, 
psychoanalysis, and psychotherapy, in the Scottish context. My research on this topic was 
originally motivated by an interest in the recovery of neglected local intellectual traditions. 
But I subsequently discovered that Scotland was particularly informative as a case study in 
the adaptation of psychotherapeutic ideas and practices to a distinct cultural and national 
context. The history of psychotherapy in Scotland shows its theoretical and practical 
adaptation to a context which was unreceptive to the Freudian debunking of religion, and 
which chose instead to graft psychotherapy into an ongoing constructive critique of the 
Christian religion by the human sciences. The stimuli of both this special issue, and a recently 
contracted monograph on the topic, have encouraged me to reflect on some of the 
methodological issues raised by this line of research, particularly the place of psychological 
and psychotherapeutic ideas in my historical practice. 
 A brief, introductory summary of my work on Scottish psychotherapy may serve to 
orient readers. A few years into my research, a definite – and perhaps surprising – hypothesis 
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began to emerge about the meaning of Scottish psychotherapy for its leading practitioners. 
Psychotherapy was seen as an ally to Christian apologetics – as a way to purify Christianity 
of supernaturalism and moralism, and to propel the faith in a scientifically rational and 
socially progressive direction (Miller, 2008). Rather than follow the reductive Freudian 
critique of religious belief and practice, Scottish practitioners tended to ally psychoanalysis 
and psychotherapy with the rational reconstruction of Christianity by the human sciences, 
including textual criticism (Miller, 2009, pp. 5-7), social anthropology (Miller, 2008, pp. 39-
42), and existential philosophy (Miller, 2009, pp. 7-14). Psychoanalysis was to purge religion 
of the inessential accretions identified by Freud, such as wish-fulfilment and comforting 
regression, leaving the way clear for a psychologically reformed faith that emphasised social 
relations of love and fellowship. An intellectual alliance was created between the Scottish 
churches and Scottish psychotherapy (Miller, 2007, 2015), and found practical expression in 
the work of celebrated figures such as the pioneering psychoanalysts Iain D. Suttie and 
W.R.D. Fairbairn (Miller, 2008, 2014) and the Christian philosopher John Macmurray 
(Miller, 2007). Scottish Christianity thus endured, and transformed itself, by drawing on the 
alliances that it had built in the twentieth century with psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. 
Even as Scotland rapidly secularized in the 1960s, psychotherapeutic discourses and practices 
offered a (perhaps temporary) safe haven for Christian life-narrative patterns, Such 
psychotherapeutic continuation of so-called ‘discursive Christianity’ (Brown, 2009) appeared 
in the career of the radical psychiatrist R.D. Laing (Miller, 2009, 2012), as well as in the life 
and work of less celebrated but nonetheless historically informative exemplars such as the 
Edinburgh-based psychotherapist Winifred Rushforth (Miller, 2015), and the spiritual-cum-
psychotherapeutic milieu that grew up around her (Miller, 2013). Rushforth, for instance, 
spoke freely and frankly of psychotherapy as a means to miraculous healing and spiritual 
regeneration (Miller, 2015, pp. 307-310), and such discourses were echoed in Laing’s 
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concept of curative metanoia, a psychic rebirth that he argued was originally encountered in 
early Christianity, and represented through metaphors of baptism (Miller, 2009, pp. 14-18). 
As a historian, I strive for ‘objectivity’ by subscribing to well-established disciplinary 
protocols. In particular, I follow the so-called ‘symmetry postulate’, by which questions of 
scientific validity and justification are suspended. This allows me to foreground other 
explanations for the adoption of psychotherapeutic ideas and practices, including a wide 
variety of economic, social, cultural, and psychological motives and factors. Moreover, I also 
eschew ‘psychohistory’, the naïve or reductive historiographic use of psychoanalytic (or 
psychotherapeutic) explanations that may be favoured by practitioners who pursue the history 
of their discipline. However, I cannot entirely separate myself from my historical time and 
place, one in which psychological expertise is widely disseminated and accepted. I may not 
write from the insider position of a Scottish psychotherapeutic practitioner keen to 
demonstrate that their particular doctrines emerge by an inner rational necessity. Nonetheless, 
a broader context of psychological ideas provides the implicit background to my historical 
practice, offering both fruitful hypotheses and credible explanatory models. The contentious 
hypothesis of a colonized and ‘inferiorist’ Scottish intellectual culture has proved 
heuristically useful to my work, and I have also relied upon the concept of ‘discursive 
bereavement’ to explain the translation of Christian discourses into psychotherapeutic form. 
 
Symmetric versus asymmetric explanation 
My research on such cultural factors as religion in the history of Scottish psychotherapy has, 
in the main, consciously followed the so-called ‘symmetry postulate’ (also ‘symmetry 
principle’). This long-standing principle in history of science was first established in the 
sociology of scientific knowledge, and given pre-eminent expression by David Bloor. The 
symmetry postulate requires that sociology of scientific knowledge should ‘be symmetrical in 
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its style of explanation’ so that ‘the same types of cause’ are used to ‘explain […] true and 
false beliefs’ (Bloor, 1991, p. 7). Bloor’s important, but elliptical statement, gains clarity 
when contrasted with the asymmetrical style of explanation favoured in earlier histories of 
science: 
The general structure of these explanations stands out clearly. They all divide behaviours 
or belief into two types: right and wrong, true or false, rational or irrational. They then 
invoke sociological or psychological causes to explain the negative side of the division. 
Such causes explain error, limitation and deviation. The positive side of the evaluative 
divide is quite different. Here logic, rationality and truth appear to be their own 
explanation. Here psycho-social causes do not need to be invoked. (Bloor, 1991, p. 9) 
The symmetrical style of explanation proper to the sociology of scientific knowledge, 
however, offers psycho-social causes for both ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ beliefs, rather than 
explaining the former’s social currency by their truthfulness, and the latter’s by extraneous 
historical factors. 
The symmetry postulate thereby contrasts with what might be called the everyday 
attitude of scientific agents, including psychotherapeutic researchers and practitioners. As a 
general rule, we may safely presume that psychotherapists typically hold the theory behind 
their practice to be valid and justifiable. Obviously, there are caveats to such a rule: 
practitioners may believe that theory poorly understands practice, or requires refinement or 
elaboration – and perhaps there is even a minority who have no belief in their method, but 
practise psychotherapy instead in a spirit of conscious charlatanry. Nonetheless, the typical 
psychotherapist adheres to the particular doctrine of their approach, be what it may 
(cognitive-behaviourist, existential-humanist, psychoanalytic, etc.). And, no doubt, those of 
us who are potential consumers of psychotherapy are ethically reassured by practitioners who 
believe in what they do. 
6 
 
The reasons for adherence to a particular psychotherapeutic body of theory and 
practice are surely manifold. But, regardless of the exact reasons in any particular case, the 
practitioner’s trust in the validity of their approach presents a potential obstacle to their 
historiographical competence. The practitioner’s natural inclination is to explain the currency 
of their ideas by reference to their truth and rational validity. A follower of Fairbairn might 
argue, for instance, that the Scottish psychoanalyst’s theory of the unconscious mind grasps 
more readily phenomena that evade the Freudian grasp – such as the now widely-recognized 
moral defence, in which the abused or neglected child internalizes its own sinfulness, rather 
than acknowledge the yet more terrible reality of its parents’ badness (Fairbairn, 2002). A 
Fairbairn-style therapist might then tend to offer asymmetric psycho-social explanations for 
the currency of rival, ‘mistaken’ approaches. If we ask her to explain the currency of, say, 
cognitive-behavioural therapy, our hypothetical practitioner may well make reference to the 
limited time available in professional practice, the restrictive and biomedically inflected 
evidentiary models that are promulgated in the health professions, and the bureaucratic 
fondness for therapeutic approaches that are readily translated into generalized protocols. In 
short, our hypothetical Fairbairn follower will (be inclined to): a) explain the fact of her belief 
in Fairbairn’s psychoanalytic psychotherapy by its rational validity; b) explain the fact of 
belief by others in contradictory schools by reference to a host of economic, social, cultural, 
and psychological motives and factors, such as economic expediency, cultural (including 
professional) prejudices, and organizational functionality.  
This asymmetric style is entirely appropriate in the everyday attitude of the 
psychotherapeutic practitioner, for Bloor’s symmetry postulate is a methodological principle 
rather than an assault upon scientific rationality (Bloor, 1991, pp. 175-179). However, with 
the aid of the symmetry principle, the historian or sociologist can deliberately neglect, 
suspend, or bracket scientific validity and justification, in order to concentrate upon the kinds 
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of explanation where socio-historical reasoning gains purchase. The symmetry postulate is a 
productive falsification, like such concepts as ‘centre of gravity’, ‘economically rational 
actor’, or the ‘the square root of a negative number’. There is no absurdity in simplifying or 
falsifying an object to know it better. As Hans Vaihinger explains, ‘many thought-processes 
and thought-constructs appear to be to be consciously false assumptions, which either 
contradict reality or are even contradictory in themselves’ (Vaihinger, 1924, pp. xlvi-xlvii). 
So the historian of psychotherapy may proceed as if disciplinary validity has no part to play 
in the explanation of why certain theories and practices are adopted. Thus, as a historian of 
Scottish psychotherapy, rather than a practitioner, I explain the fact of belief in 
psychotherapy by reference to non-rational factors, including economic, cultural, 
organizational, societal, and psychological causes. With regard to the distinctive schools of 
Scottish psychotherapy, I argue that these causes include: a context of Christianized 
evolutionary theory and sociology that operated as a philosophical customs point for Freudian 
ideas; the ethical authority and social ambition of twentieth-century organizational 
Christianity; and the appeal of preserving Christian discursive patterns, including Christian 
life narratives (Miller, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2015).  
Against (and for) ‘psychohistory’ 
The symmetry principle tends to distance the academic historian of psychotherapy from the 
practitioner. Even where these roles are combined in a single person, performance of each 
seems to have quite different requirements. This separation of historian from psychotherapist 
is intensified by the former’s aversion to ‘psychohistory’, which is regarded by academics as 
the naïve and reductive historiographic application by practitioners of their favoured 
psychological (and often psychotherapeutic) concepts. The explanatory ambitions of 
psychohistory are currently realised by The Association for Psychohistory and the periodical 
it has produced since 1976, The Journal of Psychohistory (http://psychohistory.com/the-
8 
 
journal-of-psychohistory). Readers will find in recent abstracts of the journal a variety of 
psychologized explanations of historical phenomena. The election of Donald Trump as US 
President in 2016, for instance, has provoked psychohistorical explanation of the man, his 
electoral appeal, and the consequences of his success, with the invocation of such concepts as 
narcissism, denial, and splitting. Other recent articles show a particular interest in the 
explanatory power of trauma, both in the individual – particularly in childhood – and in an 
entire community across generations.  
As well as following the symmetry postulate, I have therefore tried to avoid the 
practitioner categories of psychohistory, particularly with application to Scottish culture. The 
flexible psychohistorical doctrine of intergenerational trauma does not yet seem to have 
gained much currency in Scottish historiography. However, other practitioner-led 
psychohistorical narratives have gained credence in recent years, despite their deficient 
academic standing. The counsellor and trainer Carol Craig diagnoses the Scots in her 
manifesto The Scots’ Crisis of Confidence (2003) by using Jungian typologies. In her view, 
the Scottish nation is psycho-culturally distinguished by a preference for ‘thinking 
judgement’ (Craig, 2003, p. 58) and for dwelling in the ‘extravert rather than the introvert 
world’ (Craig, 2003, p. 48). The consequence is that the Scots are practical fellows with 
lively inquiring minds, but are emotionally illiterate and hyper-critical of themselves and 
others – hence their typically low self-confidence (Craig, 2003, pp. 48-49, 59). Remarkably, 
Craig’s diagnosis led to the founding of a Centre for Confidence and Well-Being (2004-
present) which received both charitable support and Scottish Executive / Scottish 
Government funding (http://www.centreforconfidence.co.uk/). The Centre also promoted so-
called ‘positive psychology’, which controversially calls for the disciplined cultivation of 
positive emotion as a means to greater health, productivity, and social cohesion (Ehrenreich, 
2009). Latterly, Craig has deprecated positive psychology, instead promoting ‘well-being’, 
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and drawing upon evolutionary psychology to explain the neoliberal recrudescence of 
atavistic patterns of primate dominance and submission (Craig, 2010). 
The academic response to Craig’s psychohistorical diagnosis and therapeutics 
illustrates why historians distance themselves from such practitioner-led analyses. The 
anthropologist A.P. Cohen dismisses Craig’s account as ‘misconceived theory’ and a 
‘concoction of simplistic generalisations’: ‘She sees Scottish society as generalisable into a 
collective psyche to which she applies terms drawn from Jungian analysis, and from which 
she derives a deterministic culture which explains pretty well everything from economic 
failure to dreary conformity’ (Cohen, 2004, p. 160). Yet, as much I have eschewed this 
particular national diagnosis and its counterparts (e.g. Miller, 2005), I cannot entirely dismiss 
psychohistorical analysis of Scottish culture. In The Eclipse of Scottish Culture, Ronald 
Turnbull and Craig Beveridge explain that they 
rely on the concept of inferiorisation, which was developed by Frantz Fanon in his 
account of the psycho-cultural dimension of national subordination in the Third World. 
Fanon argues that the native comes to internalise the message that local customs are 
inferior to the culture of the coloniser, a theme which runs through cultural production in 
the colony. (Beveridge & Turnbull, 1989, p. 1) 
Beveridge and Turnbull argue that ‘images of backwardness and inferiority […] govern the 
Scottish intelligentsia’s discourse on Scotland’, a rhetoric which can be explained in their 
view only by ‘the loss of self-belief and acceptance of the superiority of metropolitan mores 
engendered by the sustained and ubiquitous institutional and ideological pressures which are 
exerted by “core” powers on their satellites’ (Beveridge & Turnbull, 1989, p. 112). The 
colonial status of Scotland is certainly debatable (although perhaps defensible in terms of 
‘internal colonisation’ (Hechter, 1975)), and a rigorous social scientific investigation of 
Beveridge and Turnbull’s thesis would indeed be daunting. Yet, as part of what might loosely 
be called a ‘context of discovery’, I have found Beveridge and Turnbull’s thesis a useful spur 
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to historical investigation. It has encouraged me to ask what if Scottish intellectual life were 
systematically ‘inferiorist’ – what might have been overlooked? Beveridge and Turnbull’s 
psycho-cultural reading has thus been useful to me as a heuristic device, notwithstanding the 
reality of inferiorist attitudes in the Scottish population. 
Implicit psychologies in academic history of psychotherapy 
I may not wholly subscribe to Fanon’s analysis, and its psychological assumptions, in a 
Scottish context (although it does make remarkable sense of Craig’s peculiar worldview, as 
well as other unusual claims about Scottishness (e.g. Miller, 2004)). However, there are other 
areas of my work where psychological theses are implicit not merely in the creation of 
fruitful lines of investigation, but in the historical explanation itself. Steven Sutcliffe, 
following Callum Brown’s historical analysis, refers to the ‘striking response to the 
“discursive bereavement” (the grief at the cultural loss of religious certainties) experienced 
mid-century by Christians’ (Sutcliffe, 2010, p. 195) – including the radical Scottish 
psychiatrist R.D. Laing (1927-1989). In Brown’s history of Christianity, the primary form of 
Christian religious life is discursive, and upon it institutional and associational forms are 
dependent: the believer (and often the secularised, former believer) understands him- or her- 
self through narrative categories of ‘a life-journey, using notions of progression, 
improvement and personal salvation, whether within religion or opposing it’ (Brown, 2009, p. 
185). Following Sutcliffe and Brown, I have delineated in my own work a cultural response 
whereby Scottish psychotherapy took on, and refurbished, such Christian narratives. Laing’s 
autobiography Wisdom, Madness and Folly (Laing, 1998), for instance, has an implicitly 
Christian biographical structure arranged around a series of turning points – this is why, for 
instance, he encodes his radical disenchantment with conventional psychiatry as a Pauline 
conversion (Miller, 2012, pp. 141-142). A similar pattern is also important in the life and 
work of the far more obscure Scottish psychotherapist, Winifred Rushforth (1885-1983), and 
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in the discourses and practices of the Edinburgh-based Davidson Clinic which she directed. 
Rushforth and her collaborators self-consciously grafted Christian life-narrative patterns such 
as rebirth and miraculous healing into psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic discourse – even 
to the extent of seeing Providential forces at work in the founding of their organization 
(Miller, 2015, p. 309).  
The work of Brown, and also Sutcliffe, has offered me a way of explaining the 
investment by some Scottish Christians in psychotherapy, even as post-war secularisation 
intensified: the scientific authority of psychotherapy legitimated their discursive and practical 
continuation of Christian life-narrative patterns to which they were deeply attached. 
However, it seems inescapable to me that Brown’s concept of a ‘discursive bereavement’ 
(Brown, 2009, p. 184) has credibility because it draws upon a variety of implicit 
psychological positions. Brown’s concept of a Christian life-narrative pattern clearly relies 
upon an implicitly cognitivist psychology. The Christian’s life narrative selects and links 
together particular items of experience into a particular schematic pattern – such constructive 
activity is familiar from proto-cognitivist work such as Bartlett’s famous study of memory 
(Bartlett, 1995), and from self-consciously ‘cognitivist’ psychology in the research 
programme given an identity by Ulrich Neisser in the 1960s (Neisser, 1967). Nor is this 
schematic pattern purely cognitivist in significance, for it is reflexively internalized in the 
way theorized by social psychologists in the constructionist school, such as Kenneth Gergen 
(Gergen, 1973, 1985). Brown thus refers to the ‘subjectification’ of Christian discourses – not 
just ‘a personal process of subscription to often very public discourses’, but also ‘very private 
(indeed sometimes intensely secret) protocols related to those discourses’ (Brown, 2009, p. 
13). Moreover, Brown’s concept of ‘discursive bereavement’ manifestly identifies feelings of 
‘loss’ experienced by Christian subjects who have witnessed, and undergone, the ‘discourse 
change’ of secularization (Brown, 2009, p. 184). The language of ‘loss’ and ‘bereavement’ 
12 
 
implicitly deploys psychologized ideas of grief and mourning which have flourished over the 
past century or so, and transposes them to the loss of a discourse rather than a person. As 
Leeat Granek explains, the work of psychological experts such as Freud and Helene Deutsch 
has made our common-sense about grief a highly theorized psychological construct (Granek, 
2010, pp. 50-54). Amongst our everyday psychologized assumptions are ‘the idea that grief is 
an active process that involves an intense struggle to give up the emotional attachment to the 
person who has been lost, and that this struggle is a process that involves time and energy on 
the part of those mourning’ (Granek, 2010, p. 52). Moreover, it is assumed that ‘the death of 
a loved person must produce a reaction in the bereaved, and that the absence of such grief is 
as much pathology as is extensive mourning in time and intensity’ (Granek, 2010, p. 53). 
Brown’s concept of ‘discursive bereavement’ implicitly psychologizes Christianity as 
a social-cognitivist discourse that constructs the believer’s experience, which may be 
reflexively internalized in a socially constructionist manner, and which – if lost – may be the 
object of loss or grief in the way theorized in psychoanalytic and post-psychoanalytic 
discourses. This complex syncretism of different concepts from quite varied psychological 
schools (some of which may be in tension with each other) has been important in my work at 
an explanatory as well as heuristic level. The concept of ‘discursive bereavement’, like 
‘inferiorism’, certainly gives me a sense of interesting phenomena to look out for. But it is 
more than simply a scaffolding that can be removed once the edifice of argument is complete. 
Discursive bereavement is also something which I see evidenced in the life and work of 
Laing, Rushforth, and others: the phenomenon seems to me real, and explicable in the ways 
implied by Brown’s concept. This commitment to the reality of discursive bereavement 
prevents me from representing it merely as a productive methodological fiction. It is not as if 
R.D. Laing were adapting psychotherapeutic materials to Christian discursive patterns in 
order to deal with the loss of faith that beset him in an era of secularization. That is what he 
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was doing and why. There is, then, no magic chalk circle into which I can retreat: I am, in my 
historiography of Scottish psychotherapy, implicitly endorsing – via Brown’s concept – 
social cognitivist and social constructionist psychologies, as well as psychoanalytic and post-
psychoanalytic accounts of attachment, loss, and mourning. 
Conclusion 
Given that my procedures of discovery and explanation are definitely, albeit implicitly, 
psychologized, I must sound a note of warning about the category ‘psychohistory’. This 
concept certainly can be used – against the intentions of its practitioners – to demarcate 
psychologizing explanations that are reductive, overambitious, mono-causal, or deprecated in 
some other way (e.g. by seeming to the historiographer to be implausible or unlikely). But in 
doing so, one must be careful not to give the impression that psychologized historical 
explanation is the sole domain of psychotherapeutic practitioners who are invested in the 
validity of their particular theory and method. A related caution applies to the symmetry 
postulate, and its distancing of the historian from psychological validity claims: the historian 
of psychotherapy may proceed as if psychothotherapeutic validity has no part to play in the 
explanation of why certain theories and practices are adopted. However, the historian’s own 
activity will surely invoke ‘psycho-social causes’ (Bloor, 1991, p. 9) if it aims at adequacy, 
and thus presume the validity of various psychological school and theses. Valid 
methodological postulates such as the symmetry principle, and scepticism about practitioner 
histories, are of great value to cultural history of psychotherapy. However, they should not 
conceal the extent to which any contemporary researcher, myself included, is caught up 
always and already in a complex background of psychologized presuppositions. The 
contemporary historian is as psychologized as any other modern subject, including those 
impertinent practitioners, with their folk histories of psychotherapy. Accordingly, I at least do 
not know what historiography purged of psychological presuppositions would look like – 
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how else would I explain what Laing or Rushforth were experiencing and doing, except by 
using categories that I in fact hold as valid? 
My particular argument here is more generally encapsulated by the historiographic 
recognition, post-Gadamer, that “[w]e are more subject to history than it can be subjected to 
consciousness. Whenever we understand, history effects the horizon, never susceptible of 
ultimate clarification, of everything that can appear meaningful and worth inquiring into’ 
(Grondin, 1994, p. 114). My practice of historical reason is itself historically and culturally 
situated, and so rests upon a background of pre-judgements which include any number of 
psychological and psychotherapeutic explanatory forms. Objectivity in this process cannot 
consist of simply suspending my own judgement on psychological validity claims. The 
symmetry postulate is appropriate for the historical agents under investigation (I do not 
explain their beliefs by their putative greater rational validity). But I must accept that I am 
continually selecting, using, and evaluating forms of psycho-social explanation that have 
some affinity to the psychotherapeutic discourses employed by the practitioner community 
that I investigate. While I oppose historical investigations that are psychologically reductive, 
or one-sided, or otherwise deficient, I am nonetheless entangled with psychological debates. 
As a psychologized subject of a psychologized era, I write history of psychotherapy that is 
implicitly (and at times explicitly) psychological, and which addresses a psychologized 
audience. My distance from the psychotherapeutic community which I examine can only ever 
be partial: there is no psychological ‘view from nowhere’ to which I have access. 
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